Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 |
|
| Long title | An Act to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes. |
|---|---|
| Acronyms (colloquial) | AEDPA |
| Citations | |
| Public law | Pub.L. 104–132 |
| Statutes at Large | 110 Stat. 1214 |
| Legislative history | |
|
|
| United States Supreme Court cases | |
| Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997) Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006) Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009) |
|
Although controversial for its changes to the law of habeas corpus in the United States (Title I), upheld in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997), the AEDPA also contained a number of provisions to "deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes" in the words of the bill summary. Provisions include
- providing restitution/assistance for victims of terrorism (Title II),
- designation of foreign terrorist organizations and prohibitions on funding (Title III),
- removal or exclusion of alien terrorists and modifications of asylum procedures (Title IV),
- restrictions on nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (Title V),
- implementation of the plastic explosives convention (Title VI),
- changes to criminal law involving terrorist (or explosives) offenses, including increased penalties and criminal procedures changes (Title VII),
- commissioning a study to determine the constitutionality of restrictions on bomb-making materials (Title VII - A - Sec. 709),
- funding changes and jurisdiction clarifications for law enforcement related to terrorism threats (Title VIII),
- and miscellaneous provisions in Title IX.
Contents
Habeas corpus
The AEDPA had a tremendous impact on the law of habeas corpus in the United States. One provision of the AEDPA limits the power of federal judges to grant relief[3] unless the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was- contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
- based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
Other provisions of the AEDPA created entirely new statutory law. For example, the judicially created abuse-of-the-writ doctrine had restricted the presentation of new claims through subsequent habeas petitions. The AEDPA replaced this doctrine with an absolute bar on second or successive petitions. Petitioners who attempted to bring claims in federal habeas proceedings that have already been decided in a previous habeas petition would find those claims barred. Additionally, petitioners who had already filed a federal habeas petition were required to first secure authorization from the appropriate federal court of appeals. Furthermore, the AEDPA took away from the Supreme Court the power to review a court of appeals's denial of that permission, thus placing final authority for the filing of second petitions in the hands of the federal courts of appeals.
History
The bill was introduced by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, passed with broad bipartisan support by Congress (91-8 in the United States Senate, 293-133 in the House of Representatives) following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on April 24, 1996.[1][2]Soon after it was enacted, AEDPA endured a critical test in the Supreme Court. The basis of the challenge was that the provisions limiting the ability of persons to file successive habeas petitions violated Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the US Constitution, the Suspension Clause. The Supreme Court held unanimously in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997), that these limitations did not unconstitutionally suspend the writ.
In 2005, the United States Ninth Circuit indicated that it was willing to consider a challenge to the constitutionality of AEDPA on separation of powers grounds under City of Boerne v. Flores and Marbury v. Madison,[4] but has since decided that the issue had been settled by circuit precedent.[5]
Basketball player and later coach Steve Kerr and his siblings and mother sued the Iranian government under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, for the 1984 killing of Steve Kerr's father, Malcolm H. Kerr, in Beirut, Lebanon.[6]
Reception
While the act has several titles and provisions, the majority of criticism stems from the act's tightening of habeas corpus laws. Those in favor of the bill say that the act prevents those convicted of crimes from "thwart[ing] justice and avoid[ing] just punishment by filing frivolous appeals for years on end,"[7] while critics argue that the inability to make multiple appeals increases the risk of an innocent person being killed.[3][8]Other, more recent criticism centers on the deference that the law requires of federal judges in considering habeas petitions. In Sessoms v. Grounds (Ninth Circuit), a majority of the judges believed that the state erred in not throwing out testimony made in the absence of the defendant's attorney after he had requested counsel, but were forced to overturn his appeal. The dissenting opinion said that federal courts can only grant habeas relief where "there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's precedents."[9]
See also
References
- Peacock, William (2014-09-24). "5 Judges Issue 3 Dissents From Habeas Grant to Interrogated Teen". FindLaw.
External links
- Text of the Act, also in PDF
- Timeline of Passage
- Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary, Charles Doyle, American Law Division, Federation of American Scientists, June 3, 1996.
No comments:
Post a Comment